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The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to examine  determinants  of  ﬁnancial  information  disclosure  by  Tunisian
companies.  The  methodology  is based  on  qualitative  approach,  using  the  cognitive  mapping  technique.
To  take  into  account  the  speciﬁcities  of  the  Tunisian  economic,  we  felt that  it is  essential  to  conduct  a
qualitative  analysis  in  the  light  of which  we can identify  the factors  motivating  the  disclosure  of ﬁnancial
information.  The  qualitative  analysis  is  based  on the  census  via  a set  of  cases  carried  out  in several  Tunisian
companies  to understand  their perceptions  regarding  the  determinants  of  ﬁnancial  disclosure.
©  2016  Universidad  ESAN.  Published  by  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the
CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Determinantes  de  la  divulgación  de  la  información  ﬁnanciera:  un  test  de
visualización  mediante  la  técnica  de  mapas  cognitivos
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El  objetivo  de  este  artículo  es examinar  los  determinantes  de  la  divulgación  de  la  información  ﬁnanciera
por  parte  de  empresas  tunecinas.  La  metodología  se basa  en  un  enfoque  cualitativo  mediante  la  técnica  de
mapas cognitivos.  Si se  quiere  tener  en  cuenta  las  particularidades  de  la  economía  de  Túnez,  es  esencial14
alabras clave:
ivulgación de la información
nformación ﬁnanciera
apas cognitivos
llevar  a cabo  un  análisis  con el  que sea  posible  identiﬁcar  los  factores  que motivan  la divulgación  de
la  información  ﬁnanciera.  El  análisis  cualitativo  se basa  en  el  censo  con una  serie  de  casos  dirigidos  en
varias  empresas  tunecinas  para  comprender  sus  percepciones  con respecto  a los  determinantes  de la
divulgación  de  la  información  ﬁnanciera.
© 2016  Universidad  ESAN.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  Este  es un  artı´culo  Open  Access  bajo
la CC  BY-NC-ND  licencia  (http://creativecommons.org/licencias/by-nc-nd/4.0/).. Introduction
Several studies have been conducted on the extent of disclo-
ure in general and several attempts have been made to explain
he different levels of ﬁnancial information disclosure based on the
ifferent characteristics of the ﬁrm such as size, status trading and
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y-nc-nd/4.0/).industry type. Indeed, several theories have been used to explain
disclosure in general.
This study is to analyse ﬁnancial information disclosure of
Tunisian ﬁrms. We  felt that it is essential to conduct a qualitative
analysis in the light of which we can identify the factors motivating
the disclosure of ﬁnancial information.
Second, given the determinants identiﬁed by qualitative anal-
ysis, we will perform an analysis by the technique of cognitive
mapping to visualize the relative importance of each concept
(determinants of ﬁnancial information disclosure) regarding the
disclosure. To do this, we  will illustrate, in a ﬁrst section, the
ccess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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eterminants through a review of previous studies. In a second sec-
ion, we present the methodology based on a qualitative approach
o understand the importance of the determinants that drive
unisian companies to disclose ﬁnancial information. The main
esults and interpretations will be presented in the third section
efore concluding.
. Literature review
.1. Determinants of ﬁnancial information disclosure
Several studies have been conducted on the extent of disclo-
ure in general and several attempts have been made to explain
he different levels of ﬁnancial information disclosure based on the
ifferent characteristics of the ﬁrm such as size, status trading and
ndustry type. Indeed, several theories have been used to explain
isclosure in general.
These theories include agency theory, the signal theory, the
heory of diffusion of innovations and cost-beneﬁt analysis. Since
he ﬁrst study in 1999, the main variables analyzed were mainly
ocused around the size of the company, or the status of trading
he business of the company. This does not preclude that other fac-
ors such as proﬁtability, legal concerns and competition, scoring,
nvironment, the liquidity of the ownership structure, leverage, the
ype of listener, trading on foreign markets and regulation, were
lso analyzed by some researchers. However, their effect and fre-
uency were not as important as the company size except where
he context factors of the study had impact on the results. In the
ame theoretical framework, it is assumed that listed companies
ublish more information than unlisted companies to reassure
nvestors and obtain, therefore, better ﬁnancing conditions for a
inimal cost of capital. The sector is also a determining factor in
he decision of ﬁnancial disclosure. In fact, the industry or the type
f industry can be more or less economically sensitive, exposing
rms to the costs of different importance.
According to the theory of political costs and the theory of sig-
als belonging industrial policy can affect the vulnerability of the
rm. Firms in the same industry are trying to adopt the same level
f disclosure. Also, if a ﬁrm belonging to a particular industry does
ot go as fast as other disclosure requirements, this could be inter-
reted as a bad signal that the ﬁrm hides bad news.
.2. Characteristics of the ﬁrm
Many studies have examined the relationship between ﬁrm-
peciﬁc characteristics and voluntary disclosure level Jensen and
eckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983) studied the association
etween company’s ﬁrm size, debt ratio, owner ship and auditor
rm size and the level of disclosure.
Alsaeed argued that ﬁrm size, proﬁtability and auditor ﬁrm size
nﬂuence the level of voluntary disclosure.
A number of studies over the past decades have success-
ully tested the inﬂuence of ﬁrm’s characteristics on the ﬁnancial
nformation disclosure. Most researchers have found a positive
elationship between ﬁrm’s characteristics and ﬁnancial infor-
ation disclosure. Several reasons have been advanced in the
iterature in an attempt to support this positive association. Infor-
ation disclosures may  be used to decrease agency costs, to reduce
nformation asymmetries between the company and the providers
f funds, and to reduce political costs. The reasons for large ﬁrms’
endency to disclose more information are explained: accumula-
ion and disclosure cost of information is not high compared to
maller ﬁrms; management of larger corporations is likely to real-
ze the possible beneﬁts of information disclosure, such as greater
arketability and greater ease of ﬁnancing; smaller corporationsd Administrative Science 21 (2016) 8–13 9
may  feel that full information disclosure may  endanger their com-
petitive position. In addition, since larger ﬁrms are more exposed
to public scrutiny than smaller ﬁrms, they are inclined to disclose
more information. Large ﬁrms are likely to be more complex and
complexity requires more disclosure. Many previous studies have
supported a positive association between ﬁrm size and voluntary
disclosure level.
2.3. Industry type
It has been indicated by several prior studies that industry type
affects the level of IC disclosure since stakeholders’ expectations
as well as scrutiny from the public and special interest groups dif-
fer across various industries. Various methods in previous research
had been used to capture industry effects on IC disclosure. For
instance, Guthrie and Petty (2000) employed the 2-digit indus-
try classiﬁcation code provided by the Australian Stock Exchange
(ASX) to classify their sample into six industry clusters. Through
comparison amongst the clusters, they found that no individual
industry reported IC to a greater extent than any other. Firer and
Williams (2003) focused on IC disclosure in ﬁnance, electrical and IT
(information technology) industries and found that there was only
a moderate industry effect. Nevertheless, Oliveira, Rodrigues, and
Craig (2006) observed a statistically signiﬁcant effect through clas-
sifying industry into intangible intensive industries and intangible
non-intensive industries.
2.4. Agency theory
The agency theory explains disclosure as a mechanism to reduce
the costs derived from conﬂicts between owners (principals), man-
agers (agents) and creditors. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue
that in negotiating prices creditors anticipate the possibility of
shareholders trying to expropriate their wealth, for example, by
increasing business risk after issuing debentures. Since the increase
in ﬁnancing costs induced by such expectation must be ﬁnally
assumed by the ﬁrm, it is possible that it will try to reduce it
by: a) agreeing on some restrictions or covenants Schipper (1981)
and b) eliminating the cost of the information needed for cred-
itors to reduce their uncertainty and control managers; i.e. by
disclosing information. In a similar way, inasmuch as the inter-
ests of shareholders and managers are different, the agency theory
forecasts that there is a greater probability for the latter to act
to the expense of the former, and so they will disclose the infor-
mation needed for the principals to control agents and for them
to demonstrate that they are acting correctly Malone, Fries, and
Jones (1993) and Hossain, Lin Mei, and Adams (1994). From the
agency theory it can be deduced that the beneﬁts expected from
an increase in disclosed information will be greater in those ﬁrms
in which the reduction of agency costs are greater: those with a
greater debt, with more atomized shareholders and with a larger
size. In general, empirical studies do not support the agency theory.
The relationship expected between indebtedness and information
disclosure has not been conﬁrmed. Numerous research studies,
like Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), García and Monterrey (1993),
Wallace, Naser, and Mora (1994), Hossain and Arman (1995), Meek,
Roberts, and Gray (1995), Raffournier (1995) and Depoers (2000)
reject such hypothesis in different countries and sectors. The study
of the relationship between disclosure and shareholder atomiza-
tion has provided mixed results. Thus, whereas Mckinnon and
Dalimunthe (1993) and Malone et al. (1993) found signiﬁcant asso-
ciations; Depoers (2000) rejected such relationship. Wallace and
Naser (1995) included among the indirect costs of disclosure any
reduction in future cash ﬂows that may  result from the loss or
reduction of the ﬁrm’s competitive advantages (what has been
called “proprietary cost theory”). One of the disadvantages would
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e the entry of new competitors, which could be favoured by dis-
losed information. If entry barriers reduce such risk, it is probable
hat they allow for an increased disclosure.
Labour pressure may  also inﬂuence information disclosure,
ince labour representatives could use it in the negotiation of work-
ng conditions. Deegan and Hallam (1991) and Scott (1994) found
 signiﬁcant negative relationship between labour pressure and
isclosed information.
.5. Signal theory
The signaling theory was borne at the beginning of the 1970
nd is based on two main research contributions: Arrow (1972)
nd Schipper (1981).
To overcome the classic theory limitations, above all, the
ypothesis of perfect competition, Schipper (1981) analyses the
orkforce market with the aim of drawing some general conclu-
ions about information economics.
The author’s reasoning is simple: seeking for a job, an unem-
loyed person has something to gain from sending signals to the
arket, thus keeping his talents in the public eye in order to prevail
ver other unemployed persons.
According to this reasoning, research on disclosure to ﬁnancial
arkets posits that the most proﬁtable companies have some-
hing to gain from signalling their competitive advantage through
ore and better communications Verrecchia (1983), Dye (1985),
rueman (1986), Jung and Kwon (1988), Miller (2002). Empirical
ata, however, are inconclusive and, in some cases, contradic-
ory: few studies conﬁrm the above mentioned hypothesis Singhvi
1968), Singhvi and Desai (1971), Lang and Lundholm (1993); other
tudies ﬁnd no correlation between the disclosure level and a
ompany’s proﬁtability McNally, Eng, and Hasseldine (1982), Lau
1992); or, even more telling are those studies that show the cor-
elation to be inverse Belkaoui and Kahl (1978), Wallace and Naser
1995).
All of these studies relate proﬁtability to the global level of
isclosure. The general level of disclosure, however, depends on
everal factors (see the meta-analysis run by Ahmed and Courtis
1999)) making it difﬁcult to isolate a single signaling effect Subse-
uent research on signaling mechanism. Ross, 1977, Thakor (1990)
hows that the conﬂicting nature of the relationships between prin-
ipal and agent causes the management to focus the signal they
end to the market on a few focal points (Kreps and Sobel (1994)),
hich satisfy the users’ primary information needs. This is referred
o as the decision usefulness approach.
.6. Values of the causal relationships
The description of classical cognitive maps comes mostly from
akumara, Iwai, and Sawaragi (1982) and Axelrod (1976). Gener-
lly, causal links (causal relations) between two concepts i and j
ave one of the eight values indicated in (Table 1 Adjacency matrix).
A causal map  is a directed graph that represents an individual’s
an agent, a group of agents or an organization) assertions about its
eliefs with respect to its environment.
The components of this graph are a set of points (the vertices)
nd a set of arrows A (the edges) between these points. A point
able 1
djacency matrix (Pierre Cossette, 1989).
Concept1 Concep2 . . ..  . . Concept n
Concept1
Concept2 L21 L2n
.  . ..  . .
Concept n Ln1 Ln2 lnnd Administrative Science 21 (2016) 8–13
represents a concept (also called a concept variable in the sequel),
which may  be a goal or an action option of any agent. It can also
represent the utility of any agent or the utility of a group or an orga-
nization, or any other concept appropriate to multiagent reasoning.
An arrow represents a causal relation between concepts, that is, it
represents a causal assertion of how one concept variable affects
another. The concept variable at the origin of an arrow is called a
cause variable and that at the end point of the arrow is called the
effect variable.
We  have already seen that there are three basic types of causal
relationships: (+,-,0).
2.7. Research methodolgy
2.7.1. Description of the empirical investigation
To meet the research objectives mentioned above, a survey was
conducted among players in the company of Tunisia. I have chosen
as exploratory approach using multiple case studies. The multiple
case studies seek a better understanding of the phenomenon. They
are to study a phenomenon in its natural setting by working with
a limited number of cases. They are particularly interesting in the
case of exploration of little-known phenomena. The case studies
thus allow multiple accounts the speciﬁcities and characteristics of
corporate governance. The data is from 10 ﬁrms. The decision to
base my  study on a sample of ﬁrms from various sectors is based
on the assumption that a variety of issues will be addressed as well.
The output is a cognitive map  for actors reﬂecting their perceptions.
The method used to create cognitive maps is the questionnaire.
2.7.2. Presentation of the questionnaire
The questionnaire is divided into two parts: the ﬁrst identiﬁes
the company and the second deals with corporate governance. For
the second part, relating to corporate governance, we interview
actors from the ﬁrm on stakeholder approach of corporate gov-
ernance by providing a list of concepts for each approach with
systematic exploration grids and matrices cross. Systematic explo-
ration of the grid Figure 1 is a technique for collecting materials.
Each player is encouraged to explore their own ideas or cogni-
tive representations in relation to its strategic vision. The subject is
asked to identify important factors that he said will have an impact
on the key concept related to an approach to corporate governance.
Regarding the cross-matrix (Table 1, Adjacency matrix), it is
also a technique of data collection and the basis for the construc-
tion of the cognitive map. The matrix is presented in the form of
a table with n rows and n columns. Box of index (i,j) indicates the
relationship between concept i and concept j.
The actors manipulate the key concepts and assign pairs of con-
cepts depending on the nature and degree of proximity sensed
between these concepts. Causal relationships can take on basic
values + , – and 0.
2.7.3. Proposal for modeling cognitive maps
When it is difﬁcult to identify the goals, an integrated approach
of performance provides a holistic view in which the performance
is analyzed by the processes that lead, through the performances
of the actors. These representation processes are two problems of
implementation: the sharing of representations of actors and the
identiﬁcation of dominant representations in the organization in
order to act upon them. The construction of this representation
necessarily requires a model that allows understanding to act is
“an action of intentional design and construction, for composi-
tion of symbols, patterns that would make a complex phenomenon
intelligible perceived.
G. Nassreddine / Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 21 (2016) 8–13 11
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In this context, the use of cognitive maps seems relevant,
ecause they can take into account the complexity and comprehen-
iveness of the system in which [the behavior] is embedded, while
aintaining access to the analysis” Komocar (1994). The value of
he tool is instrumental Audet (1994), it allows both improving their
ctions and making sense.
Cognitive mapping is used as a tool for representation of an
diosyncratic schema, a pattern is “a cognitive structure that guides
he cutting of reality, the interpretation of events, and action indi-
iduals”, pattern unique to each individual, causing it to have its
wn behavior.
.7.4. The construction of cognitive maps
We  will see at ﬁrst step that allowed the construction of con-
epts, methodological approach that we discuss. Then we will
xamine how the cards were dealt.
.8. Concepts
We  addressed this issue by the representations constructed by
layers using the method of cognitive maps, a method that can be
pplied to poorly structured situations.
An analysis based on cognitive maps can understand this pro-
ess of structuring, as this model is to build or rebuild the mental
imultaneously modeling.
This construction takes the form of a structure, carrier for clar-
ﬁcation. It helps to identify ways to implement to achieve a given
oal, the same way it helps to identify the goals justifying the use
f such means. Finally, it facilitates communication and negotia-
ion. There are two major trends in the construction method of
he cards: the determination of the concepts can be ex ante, or
ubsequent interviews with respondents for whom the cards are
uilt. The emphasis is on describing the world from the experi-
nces of people who experience it. Nodes and links are determined
irectly by the participants that advocate, not depriving the sub-
ect of representations: the questions should be invitations for the
espondent verbalizes his thoughts on what he considers impor-
ant subject of research. In addition, the researcher cannot force
he subject to consider every possible link because the links must
e made spontaneously or in response to open questions, so that
he subject constructs its reality. In the normative paradigm, the
niverse is more or less determined.
. Materials and methods of structural analysis
This investigation was limited to the analysis of a collective
ognitive map  for all company, prepared on the basis of system-
tic exploration grids completed by the actors of the company.
rom cognitive maps, we could identify and qualify the designs
re the actors of the ﬁeld of corporate governance. The devel-
pment and analysis of cognitive maps were made using the
ic-Mac software. Our initial investigation focused on two ele-
ents: the relative importance of concepts and analysis of thessette, 2001. Review of entrepreneurship).
dynamics of inﬂuence / dependence concepts (or variables) in
the cognitive universe of players in the company. The relative
importance of concepts was evaluated from the MIC. Mic-Mac
program allowed us to rank the concepts in order to “balance” and
“dependency.”Thus arise the ideas that dominate in the cognitive
universe of players.
4. Presentation of variables
4.1. List of variables
Characteristics of the ﬁrm
Industry type
Agency theory
Signal theory
4.2. The input
This step was  to compile a matrix of direct inﬂuence
between these variables in a scoring session. Matrix of direct
inﬂuence (MID) which describes the relationship of direct inﬂu-
ence between the variables deﬁning the system and the Matrix
Inﬂuences MIDP represents the potential direct inﬂuences and
dependencies between existing and potential variables. The sco-
ring has developed the input matrix “matrix of direct inﬂuences
(MID). The inﬂuences are rated from 0 to 3, with the ability to
report potential inﬂuences.
5. Matrix of direct inﬂuences (MID)
Matrix of direct inﬂuence (MID) describes the relation-
ship of direct inﬂuences between the variables deﬁning the
system (See Figure 2).
CH FIRM IND TYPE AG THEORY SIG THEORY
CH FIRM 0 0 0 0
IND  TYPE 0 0 0 1
AG  THEORY 0 0 0 0
SIG  THEORY 0 1 2 0
The inﬂuences are rated from 0 to 3, with the ability to report
potential inﬂuences: 0: No inﬂuence 1: Low 2: Average 3: Strong
P: Potential
6. Conclusion and implications of the research
Empirical evidence ﬁnds that ﬁrm’s characteristics are a signif-
icant determinant of ﬁnancial information disclosure.
This plan visualizes the concepts (variables) structuring the cog-
nitive universe of actors can be projected in terms of inﬂuences /
dependencies. By the distribution of the scatter plot variables in
this plan, particularly in relation to different quadrants, we can
distinguish four major categories of variables. The ﬁrst quadrant
12 G. Nassreddine / Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 21 (2016) 8–13
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Own elaboration.
ncludes the most prominent concepts in the dynamics of thought
f the actors.
For the actors of organization, the notion of “Characteristics of
he ﬁrm” is the most dominant in their cognitions reﬂecting an
ntention that ﬁrm’s characteristics is the determinant of ﬁnancial
nformation disclosure. In almost all disclosure studies, company
ize has featured as an important determinant of disclosure levels.
he second quadrant contains the relay variables that are by def-
nition both very inﬂuential and very dependent. In analyzing the
lan inﬂuences / dependencies, there are players for the concepts
r ideas illustrating the concepts of “industry type” and “agency
heory”.
The third quadrant contains the dependent variables or result-
ng. They are both inﬂuential and very little dependent, therefore
articularly sensitive. They are the results of which is explained
y the variables and motor relay. Thus there are only one variable
amely on trust. The fourth quadrant contains the variables that
re simultaneously autonomous and inﬂuential little bit depend-
nt. They are relatively excluded from the dynamics of thinking by
he Tunisian company. The plan review inﬂuences / dependencies
how the existence of a single variable that is addiction.
The research contributes to our understanding in several ways.
irst this is the ﬁrst attempt to measure the extent of voluntary dis-
losure based on Tunisian ﬁrms. It also contributes to the literature
n whether the ﬁrm characteristics that researchers have found to
e signiﬁcant in developed countries can be applied in a developing
ountry like Tunisia.
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